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9 Residential redevelopment and
social impacts in Beijing
Hyun Bang Shin
Nowadays, people say that high-level cadres live around the second ring road,
while paupers live around the fifth or sixth ring road . . .
(A resident subject to displacement from an inner city neighborhood)
Introduction
The ongoing reform practices in mainland China have dictated profound
socioeconomic and political changes, altering the way of living for many urban-
ites. Housing reform and urban redevelopment were at the center of these changes,
governing urban residents’housing consumption practices and transforming dilap-
idated neighborhoods into a modern, commoditized space. In social terms, urban
redevelopment focuses largely on those dilapidated neighborhoods where resi-
dents have been increasingly marginalized in the process of implementing housing
reform. Since the 1980s, various reform measures were centered on the promo-
tion of homeownership through the commodification of urban housing (Wang and
Murie 1999a; Zhou and Logan 2002). These included subsidized sale of public
rental dwellings and new commercial units. Employees in state enterprises and
institutions that could maneuver their budgets for such expenditure mostly bene-
fited from the sale. Those residents in dilapidated neighborhoods, however, were
excluded from enjoying such benefits. Dwellings therein were often too run-down
to be considered for any subsidized sales. Most dwellings were owned by munic-
ipal housing bureaus or work units that were financially too weak to provide their
employees with dwellings of better standard. Dilapidated neighborhoods were
often loci of urban poverty as residents “remained in a peripheral position in the
state occupation-basedwelfare system” (Wu2004: 415). In short, those dilapidated
neighborhoods have become the “space of marginality” in the midst of the reform
process, eventually being subject to wholesale redevelopment and displacement.
In terms of urban development, such neighborhoods illustrate a different picture.
They have been increasingly recognized by real estate developers for their valuable
development potential (Wu 2002). This was possible with the implementation of
urban land reform that allowed the transfer of land-use rights for commercial
development (Zhang 1997). In Beijing, most redevelopment neighborhoods are
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located in and around the inner city districts that have become the major loci of
domestic and international business and financial activities (Gaubatz 2005).
For those residents in dilapidated neighborhoods, residential redevelopment
seems to provide differing degree of opportunities and costs. How likely is it for
the residents to find an affordable house in the market after their displacement?
What constraints would they face when entering the housing market for the first
time? Does the whole process of redevelopment and displacement shed any light
on our understanding of the housing reform and spatial changes? Based on the
findings from a case study of a redevelopment neighborhood, this chapter argues
that residential redevelopment is successful in transforming dilapidated neigh-
borhoods into a more profitable space; that the residents therein are effectively
pushed towards the urban periphery upon displacement; that it is much less likely
for future displacees to become owner-occupiers due to various policy and market
constraints; and that their marginal position in both social and spatial terms is
predicted to continue.
Housing reform and residential redevelopment
Housing reform and the promotion of homeownership
Housing reform was introduced with an emphasis on sharing responsibilities
between the state, enterprises and employees to diversify sources of investment
(Li 2005). A strong emphasis was placed on introducing market components in
the housing sector so that housing was no longer treated as a welfare good but as a
commodity (Zhou and Logan 2002). The promotion of homeownership was at the
center of these reform policies. Homeownership was thought to release the state
and underperforming state enterprises from their overstretched burden of welfare
provision, and transfer the responsibility to the individuals. It largely progressed
on dual tracks: first, the supply of commercial and affordable housing; and second,
the privatization of existing public rental dwellings.
First, relatively better-off households were directed toward the commercial and
affordable housing sectors. The latter (knownas jingji shiyongfang)was supplied at
a lower price than commercial housing, this reduction beingmade possible through
various government subsidies to developers (e.g. tax redemption) (Lee 2000). In
general, householdswhose income fell into the top 20 percent of the income deciles
distribution were expected to buy commercial housing at full market price. Those
households whose income was above the lowest 20 percent were considered as
potential buyers of both commercial and affordable housing. Over the years, the
sales volume of new residential units to individuals in urban China has increased
substantially. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, 88 percent of urban
housing sold in 2000 went to individuals instead of institutions, the sales volume
reaching 295.4 billion yuan (People’s Daily 2001). In 2002, Beijing also witnessed
a high rate of market participation by individuals in housing purchase: 97 percent
of 16 million sq. mtr of residential dwelling space sold in the market was bought
by individuals (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2003).
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Second, the homeownership rate has also increased through the privatization of
public rental dwellings, which were sold to sitting tenants at a discounted price
based on employees’work history and ranks. The privatization was emphasized by
the State Council as an essential component of housing reform policies. Through-
out the 1990s, the sales volume had been rising steadily, and a big push came in
1998 when all kinds of welfare housing allocation were terminated. A case study
on three cities, by Huang, found that nearly half of the homeowners became such
in 1998, suggesting that many urban residents rushed into the queue for subsidized
sales in order to “catch the last train” of welfare housing allocation (Huang 2004:
62–63). InAugust 2002, the then Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Construction
was proud to announce that “since the mid-1990s, 80 percent of China’s public
housing has been sold to local residents” (Xinhua News Agency 2002).
In Beijing, the concentration of government institutions hampered the rise of
homeownership during the early years of housing reform, but homeownership has
been on the increase noticeably since 1998. Surveys by the municipal statistical
bureau indicate that the proportion of owner-occupiers was just over 20 percent
in 1998, but had reached 54.1 percent by 2001. The proportion of public rental
tenants in 2001 was 44.5 percent (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2002). It
appears that the prereform dominance of public rental tenure has shifted towards
a polarized system of owner occupation and public rental tenure. Private rental
tenure was marginal and constituted less than 2 percent of the sample population.
Although the strengthening of reform measures in the housing sector was intended
to create diversity in the existing tenure structure, this much hoped for outcome
seemed to have occurred only within the owner occupation sector, which was
divided into homeownership with full and partial property rights. Although the
public rental sector inBeijingoccupies an important position in the tenure structure,
its long-term prospects are not promising due to increasing urban redevelopment
that replaces public rental units with commercial flats.
Deteriorating housing conditions in inner city districts
By 1978, the housing conditions in cities were in need of urgent attention. Per
capita living space had declined from 4.5 sq. mtr in 1952 to 3.6 sq. mtr in 1978
(Kirkby 1990: 295). Despite the increased housing investment during the early
years of reform implementation, the conditions of older dwellings in cities wors-
ened. One of the major problems was the lack of maintenance and management
funds. For instance, in Beijing, the maintenance and management fees in 1987
were, on average, 0.46 and 0.10 yuan per sq. mtr, respectively. The average rent of
dwellings, however, was 0.11 yuan per sq. mtr in 1987, and the rent for pingfang
dwellings was even lower, causing further deterioration due to near negligence
(Sun and Zhang 1989: 7).
In Beijing, according to a nationwide survey on urban housing conditions in
1985, more than half of the residents (52.7 percent) did not have a private kitchen
(Fan 1989). Nearly two-thirds (62.7 percent) had no access to private toilets, and
only half (49 percent) had in-house tap water connection. Beijing’s per capita floor
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space turned out to be 8.77 sq. mtr, placing the capital city as one of the regions
with the worst conditions. One quarter of Beijing residents were classified as the
housing poor, and the incidence of “housing poverty” was much more severe in
inner city districts (Fan 1989: 32–33).1
Implementation of the Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment
Program
In 1991, the Beijing municipal government issued a plan to demolish and rede-
velop old and dilapidated dwellings. The specific program to initiate this work
was known as the “Old and Dilapidated Housing Redevelopment Program” (here-
after ODHRP). The core idea behind it was to bring in real estate developers as
the main financiers and project implementers, while local authorities provided
administrative support. This was seen as an inevitable solution to the severity of
dilapidated housing problems and the limits of public finance. According to Sun
and Zhang (1989: 7), the total investment necessary to redevelop old and dilap-
idated dwellings in the Old City of Beijing in 1989 would be “more than 200
percent of total urban housing investment in the Old City since the Liberation.”
The turning point was the speech by the mayor of Beijing on April 30, 1990,
which emphasized the ripening opportunity for the redevelopment of inner city
districts (BeijingMunicipal Government 1990). It was stressed that a series of new
estate developments in suburban districts was providing new dwellings that could
be used for the relocation of inner city residents. In the ODHRP, demolition and
wholesale redevelopmentwas themainmethod of transforming old and dilapidated
neighborhoods. High-rise flats and commercial buildings were favored as the
end products. To facilitate the program, an ODHRP office was opened at the
municipal government to supervise and support the overall process. Furthermore,
themunicipal government set aside 200million yuan to lend to those four inner city
districts (namely Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chongwen, and Xuanwu), which were to
receive particular attention due to the severity of their housing problems.
The progress of theODHRPwas also facilitated by land-use reform since the late
1980s, which created favorable conditions for real estate investment. Legislation
such as the 1988 Amendment to the Constitution and the Land Administration
Law enabled dealing in land-use rights, leading to the establishment of a property
market (Fang and Zhang 2003: 150). Furthermore, local governments in mainland
China were given greater decision-making powers, and more incentives through
fiscal reform, to manage and proceed with local investment to meet their regional
needs and achieve local economic growth (Wei 1996). The sale of land-use rights
by the municipal government was an effective means for securing extra-budgetary
revenues to invest in elements of the urban infrastructure such asmotorways, metro
connection, electricity and water supply, all of which required immediate public
intervention for the benefit of the growing population and economy.
By 1999, the number of ODHRP projects reached 279 (Fang and Zhang 2003).
An official estimation suggested that by the end of 1999 160,900 households were
displaced, of which 43.8 percent (70,500 households) were relocated elsewhere,
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and 29.8 percent (48,000 households) rehoused (UCCBMPPCC et al. 2003).
Between 2001 and 2005, it was reported that Beijing anticipated that another
340,000 households would be displaced as part of urban redevelopment projects
(People’s Daily 2002). Considering the number of inner city residents (Beijing
Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2003), the scale of displacement indicated that
approximately 14 percent would be affected by the redevelopment.
Field research and data collection
The discussion in this chapter is based on the author’s research data collected from
a series of field visits to Beijing in 2002 and 2003. The field research took place in
Dongcheng, one of the inner city districts of Beijing. Within the district, a neigh-
borhood called Xinzhongjie was selected as the main case study area. Xinzhongjie
lies across the Workers’ Stadium outside the eastern section of Beijing’s second
ring road. The dwellings subjected to redevelopment in Xinzhongjie showed the
typical characteristics of old and dilapidated dwellings found in other redevel-
opment neighborhoods in Beijing (Figure 9.1). According to the director of the
Dongzhimen street office that administered Xinzhongjie, most dwellings found in
Xinzhongjie were public rental housing. The privatization of existing public hous-
ing units was not applied to these dwellings, as their condition was too dilapidated
for them to be considered appropriate for such transfer of ownership.
The redevelopment of Xinzhongjie was phased in, presenting ample opportuni-
ties for examining the differing degrees of impact upon residents due to changing
compensation policies. Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment started at the end
of 1999 and was completed early 2002. In total, 550 households were displaced.2
The end product of this first phase redevelopment was a commercial housing estate
Figure 9.1 A cul-de-sac in Xinzhongjie’s second phase redevelopment area.
Source: Photo by Hyun Bang Shin.
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Figure 9.2 TheSunCityEstate, the end-product ofXinzhongje’s first phase redevelopment.
Source: Photo by Hyun Bang Shin.
called the Sun City Estate (Yangguang Dushi) (Figure 9.2). At the time the author
interviewed local residents, the second phase redevelopment was yet to be imple-
mented. A household survey was undertaken in May 2003 by the developers in
coordination with the local authority in order to estimate each household’s level of
compensation. Therefore, the remaining Xinzhongjie residents had all the reasons
to anticipate demolition and redevelopment in the near future.
The research conducted was essentially qualitative, focusing on neighborhood
conditions and residents’ experiences under different compensation policies. For
this chapter, the interviews with local officials and eighteen households were
analyzed against the backdrop of housing and redevelopment policies in Beijing.
The interviewed residents consisted of three different groups. The first consisted
of those who were still residing in Xinzhongjie, awaiting displacement in the near
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future as part of the second phase redevelopment. The second comprised those
who were displaced from Xinzhongjie as part of the first phase redevelopment.
The third group consisted of those who were displaced from other redevelopment
neighborhoods near Xinzhongjie within Dongcheng district. They were recruited
to supplement the diversity of displacement experiences.3
The compensation practice in redevelopment
From in-kind to monetarized redevelopment compensation
Since 1991, residents displaced from redevelopment neighborhoods have been
compensated in accordance with the State Council’s Ordinance on the Manage-
ment of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation (hereafter 1991 State Council
Ordinance). It called for in-kind compensation, combined with cash compensation
if necessary, when residents were to become subject to demolition and relocation.
Developers in chargewere to provide rehousing or relocation dwellings elsewhere,
guaranteeing the continuation of residents’existing tenure in a relocation dwelling.
Such practice, however, led to high project costs and low profitability, eventually
becoming a hindrance to the rapid expansion of redevelopment programs (Dowall
1994; Leaf 1995).
A major revision took place in 1998. While the 1991 State Council Ordi-
nance was still in its place, the Beijing municipal government produced a revised
compensation policy by announcing the implementation of the Measure for
the Management of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation (hereafter 1998
Compensation Measure). It became effective as of 01 December 1998 (Beijing
Municipal Government 1998a). The key to this revision was the monetarization of
redevelopment compensation by taking two factors into consideration: the number
of registered household members, and formal dwelling space. The 1998 Compen-
sation Measure did not rule out off-site relocation or on-site rehousing, but, in its
actual implementation, cash-based compensation was accepted as the norm under
the new regulation, as an official explained:
The biggest difference was that [redevelopment compensation] was not based
on the allocation of relocation dwelling. All was monetarized… It also took
the household element into consideration, but it mainly considered dwelling
space . . .
(Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department,
Dongcheng district government)
Under the 1998CompensationMeasure, households weremore likely to receive
a larger amount of compensation if their household size was larger, and if they
occupied a bigger dwelling space. Only those who were formally registered as
Beijing residents were eligible for compensation. Informal self-built space was in
principle not subject to compensation. If a household lived in a non-self-contained
unit with no indoor kitchen or toilet facilities, the household was entitled to the
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receipt of an additional space subsidy of 25 sq. mtr (BeijingMunicipalGovernment
1998b). For instance, when the 1998 Compensation Measure was applied, a three-
person household living in a non-self-contained dwellingwith a construction space
of 20 sq. mtr would have received around 300,000 yuan as cash compensation
upon displacement (see Table 9.3 later in this chapter for more details on the
calculation method). For an average Beijing household whose annual household
disposable income reached 37,391.7 yuan in 2002 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of
Statistics 2003), this would be equivalent to nearly eight years’ accumulation of
their household income.
Rehousing difficulties
Due to the poor conditions of their dwellings public rental tenants in redevelop-
ment neighborhoods were excluded from taking part in the privatization process
that swept the nation in the 1990s. When redevelopment takes place in their neigh-
borhoods, residents would aspire to homeownership, as one of the interviewees
vividly explained:
It’s always no good to rent. In the end, you place this burden on your children,
and it’s not realistic either. Still want to have a place of one’s own regardless
of the size.
(Middle-aged female in Xinzhongjie, subject to displacement)
Given the practice of monetarized redevelopment compensation, did the displaced
residentsmanage to use the compensation to stay in their neighborhood and join the
rank of homeowners upon redevelopment? The scale of displacement and the high
prices of redeveloped flats in central Beijing suggests that this was not easy.Avivid
example of how the compensation limits displacees’ transfer to homeownership
in inner city districts is the case of Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment that
resulted in the construction of the Sun City Estate. As noted earlier, among the 550
households displaced from the neighborhood, only twenty of them were rehoused
upon project completion – a rehousing rate of less than 4 percent.
At the planning stage, in-kind allocation of dwelling units was considered for
residents’ relocation, but the announcement of the 1998 Compensation Measure
influenced the final decision to adopt cash-based compensation. This meant that
those displaced residents had to buy a redeveloped flat on-site if they wished to be
rehoused. The full market price of a redeveloped flat averaged 8,200 yuan per sq.
mtr, but those returning residents were given a preferential price of 5,500 yuan per
sq. mtr. This price, however, appears to have been still too high for most residents.
The rehoused households interviewed by the author purchased two-bedroom flats
with a construction space of between 107 and 116 sq. mtr. To purchase a 107
sq. mtr flat at full market price, would cost 880,000 yuan. For average Beijing
households, the price-to-income ratio (hereafter PIR) would reach as high as 25
to 1, making it difficult for them to buy a flat in the Sun City Estate. As for those
rehousing households, the discounted price of the same flat would be 588,500
yuan, one-third cheaper than its full market price. This, however, would still lead
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to a PIR of about 28 to 1, as the displaced residents’ annual disposable income was
significantly lower than that of average Beijing households.4 Given the high PIR,
it was not surprising at all that few original residents returned to the neighborhood
upon project completion. The Director of Dongzhimen Street Office recollected:
While carrying out the first phase of redevelopment [of Xinzhongjie], our
original estimate was that about 10 to 20 per cent [of the existing residents]
would be able to return, but the final result was that the number was not as
many as expected. At the time of initiating [this project], it was to demolish
and carry out in-kind compensation. Afterwards, it was based on cash. In
between, the policies have changed many times. I feel the policies change a
bit too rapidly.
(Director of Dongzhimen Street Office)
Suburbanization of displaced residents
Given the inability of displaced residents to purchase redeveloped flats for
rehousing, the remaining option was to use their cash compensation to finance
homeownership elsewhere. There were no available official statistics or registra-
tion data to reveal where the residents relocated, but interviews with some of the
displaced households and neighborhood committee leaders all suggest that most
residents moved to near suburban or outer suburban districts outside the fourth
ring road. One of the Xinzhongjie neighborhood committee leaders recollected:
At the time of displacement [as part of the neighborhood’s first phase rede-
velopment], after real estate developers heard about the news, they all came,
each of them with a coach, pulling us into the car to take us to view their
houses. So, for a while, because it was free of charge, all the residents got on
the car everyday, taking a view of those houses, checking out which area has
more convenient transportation, whether the sales price is relatively afford-
able, etc…[At that time] somany companies came. They came…from all over
the city, but mostly from the [near and outer suburban] northeast, because we
are geographically located at the north-eastern corner of the city …
(Xinzhongjie neighborhood committee leader)
In fact, the displaced residents were confronted with the acute affordability
problem experienced in inner city districts. Table 9.1 summarizes the PIRs of
commercial housing at various locations in Beijing by taking into account the
annual household disposable income. According to the table, an average Beijing
household would have to pay almost 20 years’ accumulation of their household
disposable income to buy a 80 sq. mtr self-contained commercial flat. In particular,
the average housing price was highest within the second ring road, and dropped
away toward suburban areas. The PIR outside the fourth ring road for an average
household turned out to be 7.7 to 1, less than half of what it was within the sec-
ond ring road. The displaced residents, having much lower incomes, experienced
higher PIRs.
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Table 9.1 Commercial housing prices and household income in Beijing
Location Average pricea
(as of July 2001)
Interviewed
residents
Beijing households
Annual household
disposable income
(in 2002, yuan)
Average
(N = 13)
21,003.7
Average
37,391.7
Bottom 20% of
income decile
19,384.0
Beijing as a whole 381,680 18.2 : 1 10.2 : 1 19.7 : 1
Within the second
ring road
620,240 29.5 : 1 16.6 : 1 32.0 : 1
Between the second
and third ring
roads
561,600 26.7 : 1 15.0 : 1 29.0 : 1
Between the third
and fourth ring
roads
414,480 19.7 : 1 11.1 : 1 21.4 : 1
Outside the fourth
ring road
288,000 13.7 : 1 7.7 : 1 14.9 : 1
Sources: Household interviews by the author in 2003; Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (2003);
Xia (2002).
Note
a The average sale price of commercial housing in Beijing was based on the data produced by the
National Statistical Bureau of China (Xia 2002), applied to a self-contained flat with a 80-square-
meter construction space which was the average size of dwellings purchased by the interviewed
households upon displacement.
The excessively high prices of commercial flats in central Beijing meant that
most displaced residents from inner city districts had no choice but to move to near
or outer suburban districts. This becomes more evident when the housing prices in
Table 9.1 are compared with the cash compensation displaced residents actually
received (Table 9.2). The interviewed residents received cash compensation which
was 5 to 13 times the average annual household disposable income inBeijing (or 14
to 41 times the reported disposable annual household income of the interviewees),
but the compensation was still far short of financing homeownership in central
Beijing. Most interviewees were unable to find additional resources to bridge
the affordability gap, and, thus unable to reap the benefits of their neighborhood
redevelopment, were driven out of their neighborhoods to make way for more
affluent members of society.
Constraints upon displacees
The previous section so far has focused on the affordability problem in the com-
mercial housing sector in Beijing. There are, however, additional constraints that
place greater pressure upon residents, further preventing them from staying in cen-
tral Beijing and becoming owner-occupiers upon displacement. These constraints
include the reduced cash compensation since 2001, high prices in the affordable
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housing sector, limited formal financial opportunities, and the increased housing
costs in redeveloped flats.
Reduced cash compensation since 2001
The 1998 Compensation Measure allowed developers and local authorities to
go ahead with cash-based compensation instead of more time-consuming and
expensive relocation of existing residents. In May 2001, the municipal govern-
ment revised its compensation criteria (hereafter 2001 Compensation Measure),
which stipulated that the estimation of compensation should be based solely on
two factors: first, the construction space of one’s formal dwelling; and second,
the market-appraisal value of the occupied land (Beijing Municipal Government
2001a, 2001b):
The purpose of this [that is, 2001 Compensation Measure] is to follow the
principle of market appraisal value. In other words, the dwelling space and
the market appraisal value determine how much one gets. Basically, there is
an evaluation company that completes the appraisal and submits a report to
the Displacement and Relocation Department of the Housing Management
Bureau. One copy is also given to the displacee.
(Official from the Displacement and Relocation Department,
Dongcheng district government)
The 2001 Compensation Measure would lighten the burden on developers by
decreasing the total costs of residents’ displacement and relocation at the expense
of residents’ benefits. Table 9.3 shows how much the total compensation would
be reduced under the new measure when the 2001 Compensation Measure was
applied to three-person households in non self-contained dwellings of different
sizes. It suggests that the application of the 2001 Compensation Measure would
result in as much as a 36 percent reduction of the total compensation. The table
also shows clearly that the rate of reduction would be greater for those in smaller
dwellings, disadvantaging those who had been allocated smaller dwellings in the
prereform era.
Unaffordable “affordable housing” sector
The affordability problem in Beijing also engulfs the affordable housing sector,
which was originally proposed by the government to make homeownership more
affordable for low- and middle-income households. Affordable housing had its
roots in the “comfort housing” (known as anjufang) program in the mid-1990s,
and commenced in 1999 with the aim of building flats on government-allocated
lands. A set of preferential policies, such as tax reduction, were implemented
to set the sale price within the range of between 2,400 and 4,450 yuan per sq.
mtr. In general, the price of an affordable housing flat was set to be 600 yuan
lower than the price of other commercial flats nearby (China Daily 2001). The
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sale price of affordable housing was regulated by local governments, and differed
from one district to another. In the case of Dongcheng district, according to a local
housing official interviewed, its price in 2003 was 5,000 yuan per sq. mtr. For an
affordable housing unit with a 70 sq. mtr construction space, the sale price would
be equivalent to about 10 years’ average household disposable income.
Major affordable housing sites were mostly located in outer suburban districts,
and their availability within and around the second ring road was limited (People’s
Daily 2000). Moreover, although the total number of affordable housing flats
completed between 1999 and 2002 in Beijing reached 71,731 units, this could only
benefit less than three per cent of 2,472,000 households registered within inner
and near suburban districts (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2003).
Such limited supply of affordable housing stock spurred severe competition among
Beijing residents (People’s Daily 2001). Furthermore, the affordability problem in
the affordable housing sector was fuelled by the developers’ practice of building
more spacious flats. The amount of profit a developer could retain from affordable
housing development was set by the central government regulation at a fixed rate
of three per cent of total housing costs (People’s Daily 2000). Because of this,
developers were lured into supplying more spacious flats in order to increase the
transaction volume. For instance, the average construction space of an affordable
housing unit turned out to be 95.3 sq. mtr in 1999, but had increased to 110.9 sq.
mtr by 2002 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2003: 133).
Limits with formal financial opportunities
With the emergence and development of the housing finance system in mainland
China, one would assume that the affordability gap could be addressed by housing
loans. This requires a brief discussion of the Housing Provident Fund (hereafter
HPF), which has been the backbone of mainland China’s new housing finance
system since its inception in Shanghai in 1991. The HPF receives monetary con-
tributions from both employers and employees (World Bank 1992: 30–32). The
HPF account holders are eligible to withdraw their accumulated funds when they
retire or upon making a down-payment on a new house as a first-time buyer.
The HPF, however, has been criticized as having a serious equity problem. It
is very much employer-based, which meant that those in nonregular jobs or out
of work would be likely be excluded. Workers with underperforming employers
were also unlikely to receive employers’ contributions, thus having their access
denied (Rosen and Ross 2000). Moreover, because the contribution to the HPF is
based on a fixed rate, the growing wage gaps in the labor market would lead to a
situation in which a higher income earner would enjoy a higher contribution from
his or her employer (Lee 2000).
When it comes to home buying, HPF account holders, if eligible, would be able
to apply for HPF housing loans (Rosen andRoss 2000). This has been a completely
new experience for urban residents in mainland China. To be eligible, an applicant
must have a stable job and income, and have kept the HPF account for at least
the preceding 12 months. The applicant must have also made contributions to the
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account consecutively during the last 6 months before making a loan application.
Furthermore, before submitting a loan application, the applicant must have made
a down-payment of at least 20 percent of the full price of a dwelling (Beijing
Daily 2003). HPF housing loans thus provided are on preferential terms with
lower interest rates (about 1 percent lower in 2002), offering advantages over
commercial bank loans.
The HPF housing mortgage, however, would still be too much of a burden
upon low-income households. According to the mortgage conditions at the China
Construction Bank, for instance, for borrowing 100,000 yuan over a 15-year loan
period at an annual percentage rate of 4.05 percent, an applicant would have to
repay 742 yuan each month. This would be equivalent to about one quarter of
the average monthly household disposable income in Beijing; but for those in
the bottom 20 percent of the income decile distribution, the monthly repayment
would reach three quarters of their household disposable income. It would also be
a burden upon average Beijing residents if they were to become owner-occupiers
by purchasing a new dwelling in central Beijing, where housing prices are far more
expensive than elsewhere.
Reflecting such circumstances, a housing mortgage was regarded as an “unre-
alistic” option by displacees in redevelopment neighborhoods, as some of the
interviewees from Xinzhongjie explicitly stated:
Who would provide you with mortgage? No way to take out a loan. … My
husband doesn’t have a job, and I don’t have one either. It’s for sure that they
wouldn’t grant us any mortgage. I’ve never thought of that. Don’t you ever
say mortgage again!
(Middle-aged female in Xinzhongjie, subject to displacement)
Where would I get a loan from? Once you retire, then nobody gives you loan.
If I have to get a loan, the only way is to depend on my elder son [who has
a HPF account]. My second son doesn’t have a job, and the third son is laid
off. They all can’t apply for a loan.
(Retired couple in Xinzhongjie, subject to displacement)
Such concerns would be more prevalent if displaced residents did not have
regular employees among their cohabiting householdmembers; were dependent on
the social safety net (i.e. Minimum Livelihood Security System); and did not have
HPF account holders within the household either (see Table 9.4). In fact, when the
interviewedhouseholds’occupational structurewas examined, 16per cent of all the
household members (excluding students and children under schooling age) were
found to be either laid-off or unemployed, and 27 percent, retired. The proportion
of household members engaged in temporary or informal employment reached 20
percent.5 Under these circumstances, many families would be unlikely to have
employer-based HPF accounts and creditable income-generating activities, and
therefore likely to experience difficulties in accessing the formal loans or housing
mortgage opportunities that favor those with proven credit records.
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Table 9.4 Household circumstances of Xinzhongjie residents subject to displacement in
relation to their opportunities for housing loans
Number of
households
responded
Regular employee(s)
among co-habiting
household members?
Minimum
Livelihood
Security System
beneficiaries?
Any Housing
Provident
Fund account
holder(s) among
co-habiting
household
members?
Any expectation
for formal
housing loan?
Yes 4 6 3 0
No 5 3 6 8
n.a. 0 0 0 1
Source: Household interviews by the author in Beijing in 2003.
Increased housing expenditure
Those interviewed households subject to displacement reported that their monthly
rents averaged less than two per cent of their monthly household disposable
income. This was much lower than reform policies anticipated. While the reform
measures aimed at increasing the level of rent to reach 15 percent of household
income, the rent level in Beijing had not risen to meet this target. The standard rent
in the public housing sector at the beginning of reform policies in the late 1980s
was 0.11 yuan per sq. mtr. It was increased to 1.3 yuan in 1999, and was further
increased to 3.05 yuan per sq. mtr as of 01 April 2000, but this still constituted
only about 6.3 percent of the interviewed households’monthly disposable income
(China Daily 2000a, 2000b).
While the residents expressed their desire to become homeowners to maintain
their housing security, life as owner-occupiers in modern flats would require far
more increased expenditure. Given the low level of household income and rents
they experienced while residing in dilapidated public rental units, the increased
monthly housing costs might turn out to undermine their ability to maintain their
homeownership in the future. An interviewee who moved to a walk-up flat in an
outer suburban district commented:
[Before displacement] we didn’t have to spend much. Our rent was just over
thirty yuan, and water and electricity bills were cheaper there. Now, things are
not well. At the moment, I’m telling you, I just don’t have the three hundred
yuan [to pay for the bills]. I just don’t eat or drink, but no three hundred yuan,
and that’s embarrassing.
(Female retiree, moved to an outer suburban estate after displacement)
In order to examine how much pressure housing costs might have exerted upon
residents after moving from their old neighborhoods, Table 9.5 made a summary
of monthly housing costs incurred by the interviewed households in comparison
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with their reported household income. The table only includes those households
whose housing costs and monthly household disposable income were all reported
to the author during the interviews.
In the case of households who were still residing in dilapidated dwellings in
Xinzhongjie, the total housing costs incurred each month were on average 11.6
percent of their reported monthly household disposable income and 6.9 percent
of Beijing’s average monthly household disposable income in 2002. As for the
households relocated to suburban districts, they experienced a significant increase
in housing costs. The total housing costs of those four interviewee households
constituted on average 28.7 percent of their monthly household income.
The proportion of housing costs to Beijing’s average monthly household dis-
posable income was highest in the case of those two households rehoused in the
Sun City Estate. As mentioned earlier, these households are the wealthiest among
the residents displaced as part of Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment. How-
ever, even for them, the monthly housing costs in redeveloped flats were beyond
expectation. The high cost of living in the Sun City Estate caused most of the 20
rehoused households subsequently to leave the Sun City Estate. By August 2003,
about 18 months after their rehousing, only six families remained in the estate,
and they were also considering moving out in the near future.
Conclusion
Urban redevelopment in mainland China has been transforming dilapidated
dwellings in prime locations into commercial flats, attracting wealthier sections
of the urban population. Displaced local residents were in principle guaranteed
a relocation dwelling in which they could continue their existing tenure and
maintain housing security (before 1998) or offered cash compensation to become
owner-occupiers elsewhere (since 1998). Homeownership, however, involved dis-
placement to suburban estates. Inner city residents in dilapidated neighborhoods
found it extremely difficult to be rehoused under the monetarized compensation
policy. Most commercial flats, especially in central Beijing, were affordable only
to the high income groups of urban residents (Wang and Murie 1999a, 1999b;
Wu 2002). For some displacees, suburban relocation might enable them to sustain
their financial assets (i.e. redevelopment compensation) in the form of property
assets (i.e. homeownership), which could then be used at a later stage as a bulwark
(e.g. collateral) against any potential economic difficulties. For many others who
became subject to displacement since 2001, this would no longer be applicable.
The new environment since the implementation of the 2001CompensationMea-
sure undermined residents’ homeownership aspiration and their housing security.
The new policy effectively reduced the total cash compensation, imposing harsher
constraints upon public sector tenants who were facing entry into the housing mar-
ket. Given the high prices in both commercial and affordable housing sectors, one
alternative for the displacees would be to look for a private rental unit. This option,
however, was also verymuch restricted due to the underdevelopment of the private
rental market. As of 2001, private rental tenure was marginal in Beijing’s tenure
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structure. One of the major reasons was the prohibition of resales or subletting
for a certain period in the case of those properties with partial property rights.
For instance, affordable housing was prohibited from resale or letting to a third
party for a government-designated period (until homeowners gained full property
rights) (Ministry of Construction China 1995, 1999). The same rule applied to
those privatized former public housing units. The Ministry of Construction also
prohibited subletting or leasing of state allocated public rental housing and any
of those old and dilapidated housing units subject to redevelopment. Given the
restricted supply of affordable rental units, private renting in inner city districts
was often beyond the reach of most local residents.
In the reform process of realigning the role of the state, employers and individu-
als in housing provision, local governments and real estate developers have reaped
the benefits of extensive urban redevelopment by generating revenues, “modern-
izing” cityscape and making development profits. In contrast, poorer sections of
the urban population have become increasingly vulnerable in terms of financing
and securing dwellings in the housing market. The development of the housing
finance system (e.g. housing mortgage and employment-based Housing Provident
Fund) would in principle fill the affordability gap and enhance poor residents’
purchasing power, but their weak socioeconomic status keeps them from making
use of such opportunities. With the shrinking public housing sector, residential
redevelopment could no longer serve as a pathway to homeownership but simply
force an exit to the much constrained private rental sector. This, however, could
only be a short-term solution, as the limited income of poorer residents and their
weak position in the urban labor market would pose a threat to their prolonged
exposure in a private rental sector that demands much higher rents than the public
rental sector.
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Notes
1 See Hong (1993) for the definition of “housing poor.”
2 Unless otherwise stated, the information on the status and progress of Xinzhongjie rede-
velopment is from the web site of the Dongcheng district government, and also from the
author’s interviews with local officials and a former manager closely associated with the
developer in charge of Xinzhongjie’s first phase redevelopment.
3 The recruitment of residents for in-depth interviews was designed to maximize the
opportunity to learn about the redevelopment processes and residents’ differentiated
displacement experiences unfolded in local contexts. For this, the author tried to ensure,
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within the local constraints, the diversity of recruited residents in terms of their house-
hold income, employment status, and displacement and rehousing status. In this way, the
research aimed at acquiring a comprehensive picture of the problems faced by local res-
idents upon displacement, enriching our understanding of the social impact of Beijing’s
residential redevelopment.
4 Interviewees were asked to provide the actual disposable income of each cohabiting
household member. This income mainly referred to the regular income, including
monthly salaries if employed, social insurance and security benefits (if in receipt of
such), and any other income generated from informal jobs claimed to have been engaged
in. It is possible that income might have been underreported by the survey not being
able to identify incomes from any concealed informal activities or financial support from
social networks (e.g. next of kin). The reported income, however, would still serve the
purpose of allowing comparison between relative differences in living expenses before
and after displacement from dilapidated neighborhoods.
5 The high incidence of unemployment was characteristic of Xinzhongjie neighborhood.
As of March 2002, the summary record of household registration data supplied by the
neighborhood committee indicated that 29 percent of all the residents (excluding students
and children under schooling age) turned out to have retired, and 10 percent lost their jobs
by being laid-off or unemployed. This was in contrast with the official unemployment
rate of Beijing, which was reported to be only 1.18 percent by the end of 2001 (Beijing
Municipal Government 2002: 216).
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